R E V IS E D P R O O F 12 3 The Pragmatics of Moral Motivation 4 Caj Strandberg 5 Received: 22 August 2010 / Accepted: 7 March 2011 6  Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011 7 Abstract One of the most prevalent and influential assumptions in metaethics is 8 that our conception of the relation between moral language and motivation provides 9 strong support to internalism about moral judgments. In the present paper, I argue 10 that this supposition is unfounded. Our responses to the type of thought experiments 11 that internalists employ do not lend confirmation to this view to the extent they are 12 assumed to do. In particular, they are as readily explained by an externalist view 13 according to which there is a pragmatic and standardized connection between moral 14 utterances and motivation. The pragmatic account I propose states that a person's 15 utterance of a sentence according to which she ought to / conveys two things: the 16 sentence expresses, in virtue of its conventional meaning, the belief that she ought 17 to /, and her utterance carries a generalized conversational implicature to the effect 18 that she is motivated to /. This view also makes it possible to defend cognitivism 19 against a well-known internalist argument. 20 21 Keywords Cognitivism  Externalism  Generalized conversational implicature  22 Paul Grice  Metaethics  Moral motivation  Non-cognitivism 23 24 1 Introduction 25 In metaethics, we are frequently asked to imagine people who employ moral 26 language but lack the corresponding moral motivation. It is generally presumed that 27 our responses to such thought experiments provide strong support for internalism, 28 the view that there is a necessary and nontrivial connection between moral 29 judgments and motivation. Correspondingly, it is generally presumed that they A1 C. Strandberg (&) A2 Department of Philosophy, Linguistics and Theory of Science, University of Gothenburg, A3 Box 200, 405 30 Gothenburg, Sweden A4 e-mail: Caj.Strandberg@gu.se 123 J Ethics DOI 10.1007/s10892-011-9106-2 Journal : Small-ext 10892 Dispatch : 27-4-2011 Pages : 29 Article No. : 9106 * LE * TYPESET MS Code : R CP R DISK R E V IS E D P R O O F 30 constitute a problem for externalism, the view that no such connection holds. It is 31 consequently taken for granted that internalism has an important advantage over 32 externalism on the ground that it offers a compelling explanation of our conception 33 of the relation between moral language and motivation, whereas externalism merely 34 can appeal to the impression that amoralists appear conceivable. In the present 35 paper, I argue that this presumption is unfounded. On closer inspection, our 36 conception of the relation between moral language and motivation does not supply 37 the foundation to internalism it is usually thought to do. In particular, I argue that it 38 provides at least as strong support to an externalist account in terms of a pragmatic 39 and standardized connection between moral utterances and motivation. 40 In the next section, I examine five dimensions of internalist claims that yield 41 different versions of internalism. An important upshot of this survey is that it allows 42 us to demarcate the version of internalism needed to function as a premise in an 43 influential internalist argument against cognitivism. In Sect. 3, I examine the various 44 types of thought experiments that internalists adduce in support of their view. Most 45 importantly, I argue that none of our assumed responses to these cases provide 46 convincing evidence for any of the various versions of internalism, and that all of 47 these responses are equally explainable by an externalist and pragmatic view. The 48 rest of the paper is devoted to defending such a view. In Sects. 4 through 5, I lay out 49 the Dual Aspect Account with regard to moral motivation: A person's utterance of a 50 sentence according to which she ought to / conveys both the belief that she ought to 51 / and that she is motivated to /. Whereas the first is conveyed by means of the 52 conventional meaning of the sentence, the latter is conveyed by the fact that an 53 utterance of such a sentence carries a generalized conversational to this effect.1 In 54 Sect. 6, I argue that this pragmatic account can explain our responses to the various 55 thought experiments we considered earlier. Therefore, I recommend that externalists 56 adopt this account so as to explain our conception of the relation between moral 57 language and motivation. The resulting view bestows cognitivists with an effective 58 tool to uphold their claim against the internalist argument, since it makes it possible 59 for them to adopt externalism at the same time as they can explain our conception of 60 the relation between moral language and motivation. The general line of argument 61 in the paper suggests that, in consideration of the fact that it has been quite hard to 62 formulate a viable version of internalism and that this kind of claim has a number of 63 difficulties, there is reason to think that the proposed externalist and pragmatist view 64 is preferable to internalism. 65 2 Dimensions of Internalism 66 The following type of claim can be considered as a generic formulation of Moral 67 Judgment Internalism (MJI): 68 Necessarily, if a person judges that she morally ought to /, then she is, at least 69 to some extent, motivated to /. 1FL01 1 I defend this view in more detail in Strandberg (forthcoming a), where I consider moral language more 1FL02 generally. C. Strandberg 123 Journal : Small-ext 10892 Dispatch : 27-4-2011 Pages : 29 Article No. : 9106 * LE * TYPESET MS Code : R CP R DISK R E V IS E D P R O O F 70 We shall first see that this generic formulation can be specified and modified 71 along five dimensions with the consequence that there are different versions of 72 MJI.2 We shall then see that the most metaethically significant version of MJI needs 73 to be understood so as to fulfill five conditions, answering to the first claim in each 74 dimension.3 75 (i) Conceptual Necessity vs. Non-Conceptual Necessity This dimension concerns 76 how ''necessary'' in MJI should be understood. According to a conceptual version 77 of MJI, ''necessary'' is understood as ''conceptually necessary,'' and, hence, as 78 being a matter of the meaning of moral terms and sentences. According to a 79 non-conceptual version of this view, it is understood as some other type of 80 necessity, e.g., metaphysical necessity. In metaethics, claims about meaning are 81 commonly understood in terms of what mental states sentences express in virtue of 82 their conventional meaning. Think of a sentence of the type ''I ought to /.'' Assume 83 that a person who fully understands the meaning of the sentence asserts or accepts it. 84 It is then plausible to assume that she has to be in a certain mental state. More 85 exactly, it is reasonable to assume there is a minimal mental state that she needs to 86 be in, order to it to be consistent with the meaning of the sentence for her to accept 87 or assert it. This might be put by saying that the sentence expresses such a mental 88 state: a ''moral judgment.''4 Accordingly, a conceptual version of MJI would 89 maintain that the sentence, in virtue of its conventional meaning, expresses a moral 90 judgment such that if a person holds it, she is motivated to /.5 91 (ii) Generalizable vs. Non-Generalizable This dimension concerns whether MJI 92 can be generalized to other types of moral judgments that involve a certain moral 93 concept (e.g., ought) than those referred to in a generic formulation of this claim. As 94 is clear from this formulation, MJI is typically characterized in terms of a particular 95 type of moral judgment. First, it concerns judgments to the effect that /ing has a 96 certain moral characteristic, e.g., that /ing ought to be performed. Second, of these 97 judgments it concerns self-addressed moral judgments, e.g., a person's judgment 98 that she ought to /. Third, of these judgments it concerns those that relate to a 99 person's present or future actions. According to a generalizable version of MJI, this 100 claim is generalizable to other kinds of moral judgments than those referred to in a 2FL01 2 In this paper, I consider dimensions of MJI that are directly relevant to the various thought experiments 2FL02 to which internalists appeal. However, there are other important dimensions of this view. One concerns in 2FL03 what kind of moral judgement consist (beliefs, desires, or something else). Another concerns what it is 2FL04 about moral judgments that explains motivation (their being mental states of a certain type or their having 2FL05 certain propositional objects). It should further be noticed that both moral judgments and motivational 2FL06 states might be understood either as dispositional or as occurrent mental states. I will, in accordance with 2FL07 the literature, understand both in the latter way (but see below). Internalist claims also bring up intriguing 2FL08 issues as regards concept ascription that I cannot discuss here; see Greenberg (2009, pp. 137–164). 3FL01 3 For clarifying comments on MJI, see Audi (1997, pp. 134–138); Cuneo (1999, pp. 361–363); 3FL02 Svavarsdóttir (1999, pp. 163–165); Lippert-Rasmussen (2002, pp. 8–15); Roskies (2003, pp. 52–53); 3FL03 Tresan (2009a, pp. 51–72); Zangwill (2007, pp. 91-96); Miller (2008, pp. 1–23); and Francén (2010, 3FL04 pp. 117–148). 4FL01 4 I use ''judgment'' in a way that is neutral between cognitivism and expressivism. For useful discussions 4FL02 of ''express,'' see Kalderon (2005, Chap. 2); and Schroeder (2008, pp. 86–116). 5FL01 5 At least granted that certain requirements are fulfilled (see below). Conceptual MJI is most common, 5FL02 but for a non-conceptual variant, see Bedke (2009, pp. 189–190). Cf. Mele (1996, pp. 727–753); Sinclair 5FL03 (2007, pp. 201–220); and van Roojen (2010, pp. 495–525). The Pragmatics of Moral Motivation 123 Journal : Small-ext 10892 Dispatch : 27-4-2011 Pages : 29 Article No. : 9106 * LE * TYPESET MS Code : R CP R DISK R E V IS E D P R O O F 101 generic formulation of this view.6 According to a non-generalizable version of MJI, 102 it is only applicable to the kind of moral judgments referred to in this formulation. 103 (iii) Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic This dimension concerns whether motivation is 104 constitutive of the nature of moral judgments. According to an intrinsic version of 105 MJI, it is necessary that if a person judges that she ought to /, then she is motivated 106 to /, and this judgment is by itself sufficient for her to be motivated to /.7 107 According to an extrinsic version of MJI, it is necessary that if a person judges that 108 she ought to /, then she is motivated to /,8 but the judgment is not by itself 109 sufficient for her to be thus motivated. 110 We can furthermore distinguish between different types of extrinsic MJI by 111 considering to what extent motivation is extrinsic to moral judgments. According to 112 a weak extrinsic version of MJI, it is the nature of a person's moral judgment in 113 conjunction with some further fact that explains her motivation to /. According to a 114 strong extrinsic version of MJI, the nature of a person's moral judgment does not 115 play any part at all in an explanation as to why she is motivated to /. For instance, it 116 might be suggested that we classify a person's judgment as a moral judgment only if 117 she is motivated to /, but that the nature of the judgment does not play any part in 118 the explanation of her motivation.9 119 We will next consider two further dimensions of MJI. In each of these 120 dimensions, the first version of MJI exists in both intrinsic and extrinsic variants, 121 whereas the second version of MJI only exists in extrinsic variants. 122 (iv) Unconditional vs. Conditional This dimension concerns whether the 123 necessary connection between moral judgments holds for all persons or only for 124 those who satisfy some condition relating to their psychological state. According to 125 an unconditional version of MJI, it is necessary that if a person judges that she ought 126 to /, then she is motivated to /, and this holds for any person irrespective of her 127 psychological state.10 According to a conditional version of MJI, it is necessary that 128 if a person judges that she ought to /, then she is motivated to / if she fulfills a 6FL01 6 This should not be understood to entail that other kinds of moral judgments are necessarily connected 6FL02 specifically to motivation to perform actions (or not to perform actions). It means rather that what 6FL03 explains that moral judgments of the kind referred to in a generic formulation of MJI are necessarily 6FL04 connected to motivation to perform actions also explains the connection between other kinds of moral 6FL05 judgments and motivational states, such as motivation to assist others to perform actions. So on the 6FL06 assumption that it is the meaning of a certain moral term (e.g., ''ought'') that ultimately explains the 6FL07 connection between the kind of moral judgments and motivation referred to in a generic formulation of 6FL08 MJI, the meaning of this term should also explain the connection between other kinds of ought judgments 6FL09 and motivational states. 7FL01 7 This means that a moral judgment either consists in or entails (without consisting in) a motivational 7FL02 state. If the latter is the case, a moral judgment either consists in a complex of mental states of which a 7FL03 motivational state is part, or it somehow gives rise to a motivational state without this state being part of 7FL04 it. On a related alternative, a moral judgment by itself causes a motivational state. Cf. Tresan (2009a, 7FL05 pp. 54–57). 8FL01 8 At least granted that certain requirements are fulfilled (see (iv) and (v) below). 9FL01 9 See Tresan (2009a, pp. 57–58). Cf. Sneddon (2009, pp. 41–53). 10FL01 10 In order to distinguish this view from an individual version of MJI (see (v)), we can add that this at 10FL02 least holds for a person who is member of a community in which a significant number of persons are 10FL03 motivated in accordance with their moral judgments. A few internalists can be understood to defend an 10FL04 unconditional version of MJI; see, e.g., Lenman (1999, pp. 441–457); and Joyce (2001, pp. 17–29). It is C. Strandberg 123 Journal : Small-ext 10892 Dispatch : 27-4-2011 Pages : 29 Article No. : 9106 * LE * TYPESET MS Code : R CP R DISK R E V IS E D P R O O F 129 certain condition C with regard to her psychological state, for example, that she is 130 rational or ''normal.''11,12 Advocates of conditional MJI think that the connection 131 between moral judgments and motivation might collapse if a person who holds a 132 moral judgment suffers from a mental condition such as depression, apathy or 133 emotional disturbances. They therefore advocate conditional MJI where the fact that 134 a person does not satisfy C can explain such cases.13 135 (v) Individual vs. Communal This dimension concerns whether the necessary 136 connection between moral judgments and motivation holds on an individual or a 137 communal level. According to an individual version of MJI, it is necessary that if 138 a person judges that she ought to /, then she is motivated to /.14 According to a 139 communal version of MJI, it necessary that if a person judges that she ought to /, 140 then she is part of, or suitable connected to, a community in which a significant 141 number of people are motivated in accordance with their moral judgments.15 142 Advocates of the latter view maintain that a person cannot hold a moral judgment 143 unless she is part of a moral community containing moral institutions and practices 144 that sustain the connection between people's moral judgments and motivation in 145 general. This can, in turn, be accounted for by maintaining that morality is an 10FL05 10FL06 Footnote 10 continued 10FL07 normally presumed that an unconditional version of MJI needs to be intrinsic, but for the possibility of an 10FL08 unconditional and extrinsic version, see Tresan (2009a, pp. 57–58). 11FL01 11 On a weak extrinsic version of conditional MJI, it is the nature of a person's moral judgment in 11FL02 conjunction with the fact that she fulfills C that explains her motivation to / (see Smith 1994, Chap. 3). 11FL03 On a strong extrinsic version of conditional MJI, the nature of moral judgments does not play any part in 11FL04 such an explanation. 12FL01 12 There is a complication that needs to be mentioned in this context. It is possible to combine a certain 12FL02 conditional version of MJI with a certain unconditional version of this view. The reason is that both 12FL03 ''moral judgments'' and ''motivation'' can be understood either as dispositional or occurrent mental 12FL04 states. Some expressivists accept the following version of conditional MJI: Necessarily, if a person judges 12FL05 that she ought to /, in the sense of having a certain dispositional desire in relation to /ing, then she is 12FL06 motivated to /, in the sense of having a certain occurrent desire to /, if she fulfills C. This view is 12FL07 possible to combine with a certain unconditional version of MJI: Necessarily, if a person judges that she 12FL08 ought to /, in the sense of having a certain occurrent desire in relation to /, then she is motivated to /, in 12FL09 the sense of having a certain occurrent desire to /. The basic idea is that a moral judgment, in the form of 12FL10 a dispositional desire, issues in an occurrent desire only if the person in question fulfills C. See Blackburn 12FL11 (1998, pp. 59–68), Björnsson (2003, pp. 327–344); and Gibbard (2003, pp. 152–154). I criticize this view 12FL12 in Strandberg (forthcoming b). 13FL01 13 For examples of conditional MJI that specify C in terms of rationality, see Smith (1994, p. 61); 13FL02 Korsgaard (1996, pp. 315–317), and van Roojen (2010, pp. 495–525). For other readings of C, see, e.g., 13FL03 Dreier (1990, p. 11); and Gibbard (2003, pp. 154). I criticize conditional versions of MJI in Strandberg 13FL04 (forthcoming c). It has been shown difficult to spell out C in a way which does not trivialize MJI; see 13FL05 Lenman (1996, pp. 298–299); Sayre-McCord (1997, pp. 64–65); Svavarsdóttir (1999, pp. 164–165); 13FL06 Roskies (2003, p. 53); and Schroeter (2005, p. 4). 14FL01 14 In order to distinguish this view from an unconditional version of MJI, we can add that that this at least 14FL02 holds for a person who satisfies C. 15FL01 15 On a weak extrinsic version of communal MJI, it is the nature of a person's moral judgment in 15FL02 conjunction with the fact that she is a member of a certain moral community which explains that she is 15FL03 motivated to /; cf. Greenspan (1998, p. 111); and Tresan (2009b, p. 185). This might for example be the 15FL04 case if moral judgments are about moral communities. On a strong extrinsic version of communal MJI, 15FL05 this is not the case. For example, it might be that we classify a person's judgment as a moral judgment 15FL06 only if she is part of such a community, cf. Tresan (2009a, p. 60). The Pragmatics of Moral Motivation 123 Journal : Small-ext 10892 Dispatch : 27-4-2011 Pages : 29 Article No. : 9106 * LE * TYPESET MS Code : R CP R DISK R E V IS E D P R O O F 146 essentially social phenomenon that requires the existence of such institutions and 147 practices for its existence.16 148 Moral Judgment Externalism (MJE), as will understand this view, rejects MJI 149 irrespective of how it is interpreted along the various dimensions delineated above. 150 Thus, MJE denies that there is any nontrivial and necessary connection between 151 moral judgments and motivation. 152 It is generally assumed that MJI is of utmost significance on the ground that this 153 view in conjunction with the Humean theory of motivation entails that cognitivism 154 is false and lends support to expressivism. Cognitivism is standardly understood as 155 the semantic claim that moral sentences express moral judgments that consist in 156 beliefs, and expressivism as the semantic claim that moral sentences express moral 157 judgments that consist in desire-like states. The internalist argument can be 158 construed as follows. According to a generic formulation of MJI, it is necessary that 159 if a person judges that she ought to /, then she is motivated to /. However, 160 according to the Humean theory of motivation, a belief is not by itself sufficient for 161 motivation; to be motivated, it is necessary to have a distinct mental state in the 162 form of a desire.17 It is concluded that moral judgments do not consist in beliefs, 163 which means that cognitivism is false, and that they involve desires, which is an 164 argument for expressivism. 165 We can now see that MJI needs to be understood according to the first version of 166 this claim in each of the various dimensions (i)–(v) in order to function as a premise 167 in this argument. (i) Assume a non-conceptual version of MJI: such a claim is not a 168 semantic claim about what kind of moral judgments that moral sentences express. In 169 that case MJI in conjunction with the Humean theory of motivation does not provide 170 any support to expressivism as standardly understood, since moral sentences would 171 not express moral judgments with the relevant connection to motivation or desire.18 172 (ii) Assume a non-generalizable version of MJI: such a claim does not generalize to 173 other moral judgments than those mentioned in a generic formulation of such a 174 view. In that case there is reason to doubt the plausibility of the general conclusions 175 of the argument: that cognitivism is false and that there is reason to adopt 176 expressivism. (iii) Assume an extrinsic version of MJI: a moral judgment is not by 177 itself sufficient for motivation. Assume further the Humean theory of motivation. 178 The conjunction of these views is compatible with moral judgments consisting in 179 beliefs. For example, it might be a person's moral belief in conjunction with a 180 certain further fact that explains why she is motivated to /, where her motivation is 16FL01 16 See Foot (1978, pp. 189–207); Blackburn (1998, Chap. 3); Greenspan (1998, p. 105–109); Tresan 16FL02 (2006, pp. 150–151); and Tresan (2009b, pp. 179–199). Cf. Dreier (1990, pp. 9–14). 17FL01 17 That is, a belief does not consist in, entail, or by itself cause a motivational state. 18FL01 18 However, if expressivism is not understood as a conceptual claim, this consideration does not apply. In 18FL02 any case, the internalist argument gives limited support to expressivism since it merely entails, as I have 18FL03 vaguely formulated it, that moral judgments ''involve'' desire-like states, not that they consist in such 18FL04 states. It is thus compatible with the view that moral judgments consist both in beliefs and desire-like 18FL05 states; see Ridge (2006a, pp. 302–336); Boisvert (2008, pp 169–203); and Eriksson (2009, pp. 8–35). C. Strandberg 123 Journal : Small-ext 10892 Dispatch : 27-4-2011 Pages : 29 Article No. : 9106 * LE * TYPESET MS Code : R CP R DISK R E V IS E D P R O O F 181 constituted by a desire.19 (iv), (v) Assume a conditional or a communal version of 182 MJI. As these are instances of extrinsic MJI, similar considerations hold for these 183 views.20 184 Corresponding to the various versions of MJI, there are several distinct ways for 185 cognitivists to counter the internalist argument. However, I will argue that 186 cognitivists should respond to this argument by denying MJI altogether and adopt 187 MJE. However, they need to complement MJE with a pragmatic account so as to 188 explain our conception of the connection between moral language and motivation. 189 3 The Alleged Support of Internalism 190 It is generally presumed that MJI has a significant advantage over MJE on the 191 ground that it is able to explain our conception of moral language and motivation. In 192 the present section, I will examine this supposition by considering the various types 193 of thought experiments that are assumed to show that MJI is explanatorily superior 194 to MJE in this regard. The discussion follows my description above of the different 195 dimensions of MJI, (i)–(v). 196 3.1 Individual Cases 197 The overwhelmingly most frequent argument for MJI invokes cases that concern the 198 connection between a person's moral utterance and her motivation.21 The following 199 scenario is representative: 200 C1. Anne and Bill are watching a TV programme about people suffering from 201 famine. They start to talk about charity. Anne says to Bill ''Actually, I ought to 202 give some money to those who are starving.'' There is no indication that her 203 utterance is insincere, e.g., that she is lying or is ironic. At the same time, 204 Anne has no motivation whatsoever to donate any money to the people who 205 are starving.22 19FL01 19 According to an influential version of conditional MJI, this further fact consists in the person being 19FL02 rational; see Smith (1994, Chap. 6). 20FL01 20 However, it is possible to combine a conditional version of MJI with an unconditional version of this 20FL02 view, since moral judgments and motivation can be understood either as dispositional or occurrent mental 20FL03 states (see above). It might then be argued that the resulting version of MJI can function as a premise in 20FL04 the internalist argument. Some expressivists can be interpreted to embrace this view. 21FL01 21 For some examples, see Stevenson (1944, pp. 16–17); Frankena (1976, p. 60); Dancy (1993, p. 4); 21FL02 Smith (1994, p. 60); Lockie (1998, p. 16); Finlay (2004, pp. 206, 212); Shafer-Landau (2003, p. 156); 21FL03 Railton (2006, p. 206); Ridge (2007, p. 51); Boisvert (2008, p. 169); Bedke (2009, pp. 189–190); and 21FL04 Francén (2010, pp. 119, 125). (Although these authors believe that our response to such cases supports 21FL05 MJI, not all of them ultimately embrace this view.) Many authors who write about MJI seem to presume 21FL06 that this view is so plausible that they need not provide any argument for it. It is reasonable to think that 21FL07 our assumed responses to cases such as C1 explain this presumption. 22FL01 22 In what follows, I will assume that there are no indications that the moral utterances we are asked to 22FL02 contemplate are insincere. It is commonly presumed that the fact that a person sincerely utters a sentence 22FL03 entails that she holds the corresponding belief. However, it can be argued that a person might sincerely 22FL04 utter a sentence without entertaining the corresponding belief if she is mistaken about what she believes The Pragmatics of Moral Motivation 123 Journal : Small-ext 10892 Dispatch : 27-4-2011 Pages : 29 Article No. : 9106 * LE * TYPESET MS Code : R CP R DISK R E V IS E D P R O O F 206 We respond presumably to such cases by finding them puzzling and we might 207 even want to question whether the person in question actually thinks (i.e., judges) 208 that she ought to /, even if we do not have any evidence that she is insincere. 209 (i) It should first be pointed out that our responses to the type of thought 210 experiments that internalist make use of only can provide support to a conceptual 211 version of MJI, since these cases clearly are assumed to invoke our linguistic 212 intuitions. The internalist explanation of our responses is thus that we know, granted 213 that we are competent language users, that a sentence of the type ''I ought to /'' in 214 virtue of its conventional meaning, expresses a moral judgment such that if a person 215 holds it, then she is motivated to / (at least granted that certain requirements are 216 fulfilled). 217 However, contrary to what usually is assumed to be the case, our response to 218 cases such as C1 provides very little support to a conceptual version of MJI. We are 219 told in these cases that a person utters a sentence to the effect that she ought to / 220 without being motivated to /. However, MJI is not a thesis about the connection 221 between utterances of such a sentence and motivation, but about the connection 222 between the moral judgment such a sentence, in virtue of its conventional meaning, 223 expresses and motivation. Consequently, our response is compatible with another 224 explanation than the one proposed by internalists: what explains that we find a case 225 such as C1 puzzling is that a person's utterance of a sentence to the effect that she 226 ought to / standardly conveys that she is motivated to /, not that the sentence she 227 utters expresses a moral judgment that is necessarily accompanied by motivation. 228 Our response thus leaves open to the possibility that even if it is anomalous for a 229 person to utter such a sentence without being accordingly motivated, it is possible 230 for a person to hold such a judgment without being accordingly motivated. Later on 231 we will see that this view also can explain why we might come to doubt that a 232 person who makes such a moral utterance, without being motivated to /, thinks that 233 she ought to /.23 234 This argument is similar to a well-known objection against inferences from use to 235 meaning. When internalists appeal to cases such as C1, they argue in effect that we 236 feel that it is odd to use a certain type of moral sentence in the absence of 237 motivation, and they take this to indicate that the sentence expresses a moral 238 judgment that is necessarily accompanied by motivation. A number of philosophers 239 have pointed out that from the fact that it would be odd to use a given expression in 240 certain circumstances we cannot draw any definitive conclusion as regards its 241 meaning.24 In the same vein, I argue that the fact that it is odd to use a certain type 242 of moral sentence unless one is accordingly motivated should not make us infer 243 MJI. These philosophers often maintain that we instead should adopt a pragmatic 244 explanation of why it is odd to use an expression in certain circumstances. Consider: 22FL05 22FL06 Footnote 22 continued 22FL07 (Ridge 2006b, pp. 487–495). Whether this view is correct does not affect my arguments as they also apply 22FL08 to cases where a person explicitly is said to hold the moral judgment in question. 23FL01 23 Cf. Frankena (1976, pp. 66–67). 24FL01 24 For classical formulations of this argument, see Searle (1962, pp. 423–432; 1969, Chap. 6), esp. 24FL02 pp. 146–149; and Grice (1989a, pp. 220–240). For some recent formulations, see Neale (1992, 24FL03 pp. 512–520); Soames (2003, pp. 146–147); and Kalderon (2005, Chap. 2). C. Strandberg 123 Journal : Small-ext 10892 Dispatch : 27-4-2011 Pages : 29 Article No. : 9106 * LE * TYPESET MS Code : R CP R DISK R E V IS E D P R O O F 245 C2. Anne and Bill are professors at the philosophy department. They are 246 discussing which students that will be admitted to the master programme in 247 ethics. Anne says to Bill ''David or Saul will be admitted to the master 248 programme.'' There is no indication that her utterance is insincere, e.g., that 249 she is lying or is ironic. At the same time, Anne thinks that both David and 250 Saul will be admitted to the programme. 251 It is plausible to assume that we respond to C2 by finding it puzzling since a 252 person's utterance to the effect that David or Saul will be admitted to the master 253 programme strongly indicates that she does not think that both of them will. We 254 might even hesitate to ascribe to her the belief that David or Saul will be thus 255 admitted in that case. However, according to the received view, the sentence ''David 256 or Saul will be admitted to the master programme'' does not entail that not both of 257 them will be admitted to the programme. To formulate the point in the vocabulary 258 utilized above: The sentence does not, in virtue of its conventional meaning, express 259 a belief entailing that not both David and Saul will be admitted to the programme. 260 Rather, it is a person's utterance of a sentence of the type ''X or Y'' which 261 standardly conveys that not both X and Y are the case. Thus, our response to C2 262 should not be explained by the meaning of the sentence in question. It should rather 263 be explained by there being a standardized pragmatic connection between utterances 264 of this type of sentence and the mentioned piece of information.25 Importantly, this 265 suggests that the explanation of why we find C1 puzzling might be of the same kind 266 as the explanation of why we find C2 puzzling: there is a standardized pragmatic 267 connection between utterances of a certain type of sentence and a certain piece of 268 information. 269 In reply, internalists might object that there is another type of case that provides 270 stronger support to their view:26 271 C3. Anne is alone at home watching a TV programme about people suffering 272 from famine. Anne starts to think about charity. She thinks to herself that she 273 ought to give some money to those who are starving. At the same time, Anne 274 has no motivation whatsoever to donate any money to the people who are 275 starving. 276 Internalists might argue that we respond to cases such as C3 by finding them 277 puzzling; indeed, they might even be inclined to declare that such cases are 278 impossible. The idea is then that this response would give stronger support to MJI 279 than our response to C1, since C3 concerns moral judgments rather than moral 280 utterances. 281 It is first worth noticing that internalists appeal to cases such as C3 much less 282 frequently than they appeal to cases such as C1. This is in itself remarkable since, 25FL01 25 According to a prevalent view, a sentence of the type ''X or Y'' carries a generalized conversational 25FL02 implicature which accounts for this fact; see, e.g., Grice (1989b, 44–47); Levinson (2000, pp. 75–111); 25FL03 and Soames (2003, pp. 206–210). However, the generalized conversational implicature in question is 25FL04 more complicated than I can do justice to here. 26FL01 26 For example, see Milo (1981, p. 375); Smith (1994, p. 60); and Shafer-Landau (2003, p. 156). It is not 26FL02 evident that they have this type of cases in mind as it is not clear what they mean by ''judgment.'' The Pragmatics of Moral Motivation 123 Journal : Small-ext 10892 Dispatch : 27-4-2011 Pages : 29 Article No. : 9106 * LE * TYPESET MS Code : R CP R DISK R E V IS E D P R O O F 283 as just noticed, our response to them would provide stronger evidence for MJI. 284 Indeed, it might even be suggested that the fact that internalists appeal to cases such 285 as C1, rather than C3, suggests a pragmatic explanation on the lines indicated above. 286 More importantly, the fact that we find cases such as C3 puzzling does not help 287 the sake of MJI. The reason is that we respond in the same manner to cases where 288 our response cannot be explained in terms of meaning but needs to be explained 289 pragmatically. Consider: 290 C4. Anne, who is a professor at the philosophy department, is alone working. 291 She is thinking about which students that will be admitted to the master 292 programme in ethics. Anne thinks to herself that David or Saul will be 293 admitted to the master programme. At the same time, Anne thinks to herself 294 that both David and Saul will be admitted to the programme. 295 It is plausible to assume that we respond to C4 by finding it puzzling because 296 describing a person as thinking that David or Saul will be admitted to the master 297 programme strongly indicates that she does not think that both of them will. 298 However, as our discussion of C2 makes clear, this should not be explained by the 299 conventional meaning of the sentence ''David or Saul will be admitted to the master 300 programme.'' In view of our considerations in relation to C2, it is plausible to 301 assume that it should be explained by there being a standardized pragmatic 302 connection between utterances of a sentence of the type ''X or Y'' and the 303 contention that not both X and Y are the case. More precisely, it is plausible to 304 assume that we have, so to speak, internalized this connection in such a way that it 305 has become part of our notion of the connection between ''X or Y'' and ''not X and 306 Y.'' Importantly, this means that our response to C3 does not give any advantage to 307 MJI over an externalist and pragmatic account. In other words, just as our response 308 to C4 should be explained by means of pragmatic considerations, it might be that 309 our response to C3 should be explained in this manner as well. 310 (ii) The type of cases that internalists appeal to in defence of their view, such as 311 C1 and C3, concern a particular type of moral judgments, corresponding to the type 312 of judgments referred to in a generic formulation of MJI. This means that our 313 responses to such cases do not provide support to a generalized version of MJI 314 according to which such a claim can be generalized to other kinds of moral 315 judgments than those referred to in a generic formulation. It is plausible to doubt, 316 however, that MJI can be thus generalizable in view of the numerous types of 317 contexts a certain moral concept can be involved in. Importantly, if MJI is not 318 generalizable it is reasonable to question whether it can constitute a conceptually 319 necessary claim. The reason is that such a claim reasonably has to be generalizable 320 to all judgments involving the same moral concept irrespective of how they diverge 321 with regard to the various aspects of moral judgments mentioned earlier. 322 Unfortunately, I cannot pursue this argument in the present paper as it brings up 323 a number of complex topics. 324 (iii) It can next be observed that our response to cases such as C1 or C3 provides 325 support neither to an intrinsic nor an extrinsic version of MJI. 326 According to intrinsic version of MJI, a person's judgment that she ought to / is 327 by itself sufficient for her to be motivated to /. Our responses to cases such as C. Strandberg 123 Journal : Small-ext 10892 Dispatch : 27-4-2011 Pages : 29 Article No. : 9106 * LE * TYPESET MS Code : R CP R DISK R E V IS E D P R O O F 328 C1 and C3 do not provide evidence to this version of MJI. They merely show that if 329 we are told that a person utters a certain type of moral sentence, or holds a certain 330 kind of moral judgment, without being accordingly motivated, we are puzzled and 331 perhaps even inclined to protest that she cannot really be holding the moral 332 judgment in question.27 There is nothing in this response which shows that the 333 judgment itself, or even a part of it, needs to be involved in an explanation of the 334 motivation in question. It should particularly be observed that our responses to cases 335 such as C1 or C3 do not provide support to an intrinsic version of MJI over an 336 extrinsic variant of this view. The explanation of our response might be that we are 337 told that a person judges that she ought to / without being motivated to /, and that 338 we tacitly presume some further relevant consideration. For instance, it might be 339 that we classify a person's judgment as a moral judgment only if it is accompanied 340 by motivation, although the judgment need not be involved in the explanation of the 341 motivation.28 As we presume that the person figuring in these cases holds a moral 342 judgment, we are puzzled when we are told that she is not accordingly motivated. 343 According to an extrinsic version of MJI, a person's judgment that she ought to / 344 is not sufficient by itself for her to be motivated to /. Our responses to cases such as 345 C1 and C3 do not lend support to this view for the simple reason that they do not 346 make explicit reference to any additional consideration, such as the one just 347 mentioned, which would explain why we respond to these cases by finding them 348 puzzling. (But see the discussion on conditional MJI below.) 349 (iv) We might next consider the dimension pertaining to unconditional and 350 conditional MJI. 351 According to a unconditional version of MJI, it is necessary that if a person 352 judges that she ought to /, then she is motivated to /, and this holds for all persons 353 irrespective of their mental condition. First, this view has the same type of difficulty 354 as an intrinsic version of MJI. Plausibly, we generally presume that people do not 355 suffer from, say, depression or apathy in the absence of information to this effect. 356 As a consequence, the explanation of why we respond to cases as C1 or C3 as we do 357 might be that we presume that the person in question does not suffer from any 358 mental condition of the relevant kind. Second, consider: 27FL01 27 It might be objected that there are cases which provide support to an intrinsic version of MJI. This 27FL02 would be cases in which a person utters that she ought to /, is motivated to /, but her motivation is not 27FL03 explained by her moral judgment. Consider the following case: Anne and Bill are watching a TV 27FL04 programme about people suffering from famine. They start to talk about charity. Anne says to Bill 27FL05 ''Actually, I ought to give some money to those who are starving.'' There is no indication that her 27FL06 utterance is not sincere, e.g., that she is lying or is ironic. Anne is motivated to give money to charity. She 27FL07 is not motivated by what she regards as moral considerations but merely by what she regards as non27FL08 moral considerations. More precisely, she is only motivated to give money to charity so as to be admired 27FL09 by her friends (cf. Sneddon 2009, pp. 41–53). First, it is plausible to assume that we do not find these 27FL10 cases as puzzling as C1. One indication is that internalists never appeal to them when arguing for their 27FL11 view. Second, our response to these cases would merely indicate that a person's moral judgment 27FL12 somehow is part of an explanation of her motivation to perform a certain action, not that the judgment by 27FL13 itself is sufficient for this motivation. Hence, it is compatible both with a conditional and a communal 27FL14 version of MJI. Finally, our response is compatible with a pragmatic and externalist account according to 27FL15 which we regularly are motivated in accordance with what we think we have moral reasons to do. I will 27FL16 return to this explanation in Sect. 6. 28FL01 28 Cf. Tresan (2006, pp. 148–149); and Sneddon (2009, pp. 41–53). The Pragmatics of Moral Motivation 123 Journal : Small-ext 10892 Dispatch : 27-4-2011 Pages : 29 Article No. : 9106 * LE * TYPESET MS Code : R CP R DISK R E V IS E D P R O O F 359 C5. Identical to C1, except for the additional information: There are 360 indications that Anne is deeply depressed. 361 It seems plausible to assume that we do not find cases such as C5 particularly 362 puzzling, since it makes reference to a possible explanation of the person's lack of 363 motivation. Thus, there is reason to think that a person who judges that she ought to 364 / need not be motivated to / quite irrespective of her mental condition. 365 According to a conditional version of MJI, it is necessary that if a person judges 366 that she ought to /, then she is motivated to / if she fulfills condition C. What I said 367 above suggests that this view gets support from a comparison between C5 and 368 another type of case. Consider: 369 C6. Identical to C1, except for the additional information: There is no 370 indication that Anne suffers from a mental condition such as depression, 371 apathy, emotional disturbances, or the like. 372 It is plausible to assume that we find cases such as C6 puzzling. Moreover, 373 it might be argued that since we find C6 more puzzling than C5, a conditional 374 version of MJI is preferable to an unconditional version of this view. 375 However, the fact that we respond differently to cases such as C5 and C6 give 376 limited support to a conditional version of MJI, since there is an alternative 377 pragmatic explanation of our reactions. These responses amount to the following: 378 we are more puzzled by cases (such as C6) in which a person utters a sentence to the 379 effect that she ought to /, is not motivated to /, and she is reported not to suffer 380 from a mental condition like depression, than cases (such as C5) in which she is 381 reported to suffer from such a inadequacy. According to the relevant conditional 382 version of MJI, the explanation of our responses is that the sentence the person 383 utters expresses a judgment such that if a person holds the judgment, she is 384 motivated to /, provided that she fulfills a certain condition C with regard to her 385 mental condition. However, there is a pragmatic explanation of our responses: 386 A person's utterance of a sentence to the effect that she ought to / standardly 387 conveys that she is motivated to /, granted the assumption that she does not 388 suffer from a mental condition of the relevant kind. I will return to this explanation 389 in Sect. 6. 390 3.2 Communal Cases 391 A number of internalists have appealed to cases that concern the connection 392 between the moral language in an entire community and motivation.29 Consider: 393 C7. There is an alien community which in many respects is like ours. People in 394 this community utter sentences to the effect that certain actions ought to be 395 performed. For example, when discussing charity, some of them might say 396 things like ''Actually, I ought to give some money to those who are starving.'' 29FL01 29 See Dreier (1990, pp. 13–14); Blackburn (1995, pp. 48, 52–53); Lenman (1999, pp. 445–446, 29FL02 452–453); Joyce (2001, pp. 26–27); Bedke (2009, pp. 194–195); and Tresan (2009b, pp. 185–186). 29FL03 Cf. Hare (1952, pp. 148–149); and Blackburn (1998, pp. 61–65). These authors consider cases that vary in 29FL04 different respects, but I do not think these differences are relevant to my arguments. C. Strandberg 123 Journal : Small-ext 10892 Dispatch : 27-4-2011 Pages : 29 Article No. : 9106 * LE * TYPESET MS Code : R CP R DISK R E V IS E D P R O O F 397 There is no indication that their utterances are generally insincere; e.g., there 398 are no indications that they generally are lying or are ironic. No one in this 399 community who makes such utterances has, or has ever had, any motivation 400 whatsoever to perform any of these actions.30 401 We respond presumably to such cases by finding them puzzling and we might 402 even come to question whether people in this community have a moral language. 403 Let us start with observing that our response to cases such as C7 does not give 404 any support to an individual version of MJI. According to this view, it is necessary 405 that if a person judges that she ought to /, then she is motivated to /.31 However, 406 what we find puzzling in C7 is not that there is a single person who utters, or judges, 407 that she ought to / and that she fails to be motivated to /, but that there is a whole 408 community in which there are persons who utter that they ought to / and that each 409 of them fails to be motivated to /. Our response leaves consequently open the 410 possibility that a person might hold a moral judgment even if she is not accordingly 411 motivated.32 412 (v) Advocates of communal versions of MJI argue that although our response to 413 cases such as C7 does not provide support to individual version of MJI, it provides 414 support to communal MJI. In particular, they take our response to suggest that in 415 order for a person to judge that she ought to /, she must be part of a community in 416 which a significant number of people are motivated in accordance with their moral 417 judgments, even if she need not be motivated to / herself. 418 However, our response to cases such as C7 provides little support even to 419 communal MJI. The most important reason from the present perspective is that 420 these cases concern the connection between utterances of moral sentences and 421 motivation, not the connection between moral judgments and motivation. They 422 leave consequently open the possibility that there is no necessary connection 423 between moral judgments and motivation even at a communal level. In particular, 424 they are compatible with a pragmatic account according to which there is a 425 standardized connection between moral utterances and motivation. Consider: 426 C8. There is an alien community which in many respects is like ours. People in 427 this community utter sentences of the type ''X or Y.'' For example, when 428 discussing which students that will be admitted to the master programme in 429 ethics, philosophy professors might say things like ''David or Saul will be 430 admitted to the master programme.'' There is no indication that their 431 utterances generally are insincere; e.g., there are no indications that they 432 generally are lying or ironic. No one in this community who makes such 433 utterances thinks, or has ever thought, that not both X and Y is the case. For 434 example, none of the mentioned philosophy professors thinks, or has ever 435 thought, that not both David and Saul will be admitted to the master 436 programme. 30FL01 30 We might also add: ''Moreover, there is no indication that the people in this society generally suffer 30FL02 from mental conditions such as depression, apathy, emotional disturbances, or the like.'' 31FL01 31 That is, at least granted that she satisfies condition C. 32FL01 32 Cf. Gert and Mele (2005, p. 281). The Pragmatics of Moral Motivation 123 Journal : Small-ext 10892 Dispatch : 27-4-2011 Pages : 29 Article No. : 9106 * LE * TYPESET MS Code : R CP R DISK R E V IS E D P R O O F 437 We are presumably liable to find such cases puzzling. According to the received 438 view, the explanation of our response is not that a sentence of the type ''X or Y,'' in 439 virtue of its conventional meaning, expresses a belief which entails that not both X 440 and Y are the case, even granted that the person in question is part of a community 441 in which a significant number of people who holds the first belief hold the second. 442 As before, the explanation is rather that there is a standardized pragmatic connection 443 between utterances of a sentence of the type ''X or Y'' and the mentioned piece of 444 information.33 445 It might be objected that we find communal cases, such as C7, more puzzling 446 than individual cases, such as C1. It is this difference proponents of communal MJI 447 employ so as to make plausible the claim that even if it is possible for a person to 448 judge that she ought to / without being motivated to /, it is not possible for a 449 person to judge that she ought to / unless she is part of a community in which there 450 is a significant correlation between moral judgments and motivation.34 It might then 451 be maintained that a pragmatic account cannot explain this difference between the 452 individual and communal level. But this difference is not surprising on the 453 suggestion that there is a standardized pragmatic connection between moral 454 utterances and motivation. In C7 no one who utters that she ought to / is motivated 455 to /, whereas this is the case only as regards one person in C1. Similarly, 456 corresponding to our responses to C1 and C7, we presumably find C8 more puzzling 457 than C2. Furthermore, it is reasonable to argue that the pragmatic connection 458 between moral utterances and motivation is a matter of the function moral language 459 has in an entire community. 460 Let us summarize. First, we have seen that none of the responses that we are 461 presumed that have in relation to the thought experiments internalists employ 462 provides convincing support to any of the various versions of MJI. Importantly, 463 it follows that these responses do not provide evidence to a version of MJI that can 464 function as a premise in the internalist argument against cognitivism. It should also 465 be stressed that in reaching this conclusion, I have presumed that internalists are 466 correct about our responses. In other words, externalists need not contest that we 467 have these responses in order to challenge MJI. Second, I have indicated that our 468 responses to these cases can be explained by an externalist account that exploits a 469 standardized pragmatic connection between moral utterances and motivation. Third, 470 as the metaethical literature bears witness, internalist claims have a number of 471 well-documented difficulties.35 In view of these considerations, there is reason to 472 further investigate the plausibility of an externalist and pragmatic alternative. 473 However, in order to be plausible, this view needs to explain how utterances of 474 moral sentences standardly convey motivation in a way which might be taken to 33FL01 33 It would not help advocates of communal MJI to employ communal cases that concern moral 33FL02 judgments rather than moral utterances. The reason is that we can use the same manoeuvre as we used 33FL03 above when we compared our responses to C3 and C4. That is, we can set up a case like C8 but which 33FL04 concerns people's beliefs that X or Y is the case rather than their utterances to this effect. We would 33FL05 presumably find such cases just as puzzling as their moral counterparts. 34FL01 34 See Greenspan (1998, p. 106); and Tresan (2009b, pp. 185–186, 193). 35FL01 35 In fact, internalists seem to differ as regards their intuitions regarding certain central cases; see 35FL02 Francén (2010, pp. 117–148). C. Strandberg 123 Journal : Small-ext 10892 Dispatch : 27-4-2011 Pages : 29 Article No. : 9106 * LE * TYPESET MS Code : R CP R DISK R E V IS E D P R O O F 475 suggest that it should be explained in terms of the conventional meaning of these 476 sentences. In what follows, I will argue that externalists can provide such an account 477 in terms of Paul Grice's notion of general conversational implicature.36 478 4 Two Purposes of Moral Discourse 479 A governing idea in Grice's theory of conversational implicatures is that we 480 contribute to the conversations in which we are engaged in the ways that are 481 required to fulfill the mutually accepted purposes of these conversations. He 482 formulates a number of maxims which make it possible for us to fulfill this goal. 483 The two I will make use is the maxim of relation, which states that one should make 484 one's contributions so as to be relevant in consideration of the purposes of the 485 conversation in question, and the second maxim of quantity, which states that one 486 should not make one's contributions more informative than is required in 487 consideration of these purposes.37 In Grice's view, the fact that we are understood 488 to conform to these maxims can make our utterances convey information that is not 489 part of the conventional meaning of the sentences we employ. He refers to this 490 information as ''conversational implicatures.'' 491 To illustrate, assume that Anne and Bill work together with trying to assemble a 492 bookcase and that Anne says to Bill ''The screwdriver is over there.'' It is 493 reasonable to assume that, given certain features of the context, Bill understands 494 Anne's utterance to convey that she wants him to give her the screwdriver. This 495 cannot be explained by the conventional meaning of the sentence she utters. Simply 496 put, it should rather be explained by the fact that a mutually recognized purpose of 497 their conversation is that they should put together the bookcase and that they are 498 assumed to make utterances that are relevant given this purpose. On these 499 assumptions, the most reasonable understanding of Anne's utterance is that she 500 wants Bill to give her the screwdriver.38 501 Grice distinguishes between two kinds of conversational implicatures. To see the 502 difference, assume that an utterance of a sentence s with the conventional meaning 503 p conversationally implicates q. 504 It is a particularized conversational implicature (PCI) in case an utterance of 505 s does not standardly conversationally implicate q. The utterance carries the 506 implicature in question only on the assumption that the context in which it is uttered 507 has certain specific features justifying this understanding of it. (The case above is an 508 example of PCI.) 509 It is a generalized conversational implicature (GCI) in case an utterance of 510 s standardly conversationally implicates q. The utterance carries the implicature in 36FL01 36 For other pragmatic accounts, see Copp (2001, pp. 1–43; 2009, pp. 167–202); Finlay (2004, 36FL02 pp. 205–223; 2005, pp. 1–20). In Strandberg (forthcoming a), I argue that the alternative proposed below 36FL03 has a number of significant advantages to these views. For other pragmatic suggestions, see Searle (1969, 36FL04 Chap. 6; 1979, pp. 32, 39–40); Ridge (2003, pp. 563–574); Railton (2006, pp. 212–215); and Cholbi 36FL05 (2009, 495–510). 37FL01 37 Grice (1989a, pp. 26–27). 38FL01 38 Cf. Grice (1989a, p. 29). The Pragmatics of Moral Motivation 123 Journal : Small-ext 10892 Dispatch : 27-4-2011 Pages : 29 Article No. : 9106 * LE * TYPESET MS Code : R CP R DISK R E V IS E D P R O O F 511 question even if the contexts in which it is uttered do not have any specific features 512 that justify this understanding of it. Hence, a GCI does not need contextual features 513 of this kind to arise but arises unless there are any specific circumstances that defeat 514 it.39 515 An important idea in Grice's theory is that utterances carry conversational 516 implicatures because there are certain mutually recognized purposes of the 517 conversations in question. In what follows, I will maintain that externalists should 518 maintain that there are two mutually accepted purposes that generally are present in 519 moral conversations. 520 (1) The first general purpose of moral conversation is to communicate what the 521 participants of the conversation believe about moral matters. For example, in moral 522 conversations people communicate their beliefs that certain actions ought to be 523 performed. This exemplifies the kind of purpose Grice describes as ''giving and 524 receiving information.''40 525 This purpose corresponds to what constitutes the conventional meaning of moral 526 sentences according to cognitivism. A main objective of the present paper is, as 527 pointed out in the introduction, to defend MJE in order to save cognitivism from the 528 internalist argument. Consequently, in what follows I will investigate the prospects 529 of combining cognitivism with an externalist and pragmatic view. It should be 530 emphasized that the view I am defending does not entail a particular version of 531 cognitivism but is compatible with any relevant version of this view. However, it 532 presupposes one important but uncontroversial requirement: A sentence to the effect 533 that a person morally ought to / entails that she has a moral reason to /.41 A reason 534 to / consists, according to a widely accepted view, in a fact which ''counts in 535 favour'' of /ing.42 In other words, a sentence to the effect that a person morally 536 ought to / entails that /ing has some feature which, from the point of view of 537 morality, counts in favour of that person /ing. This requirement does not entail any 538 particular conception of moral reasons. In particular, it does not entail that moral 539 reasons constitute normative reasons where such reasons are understood in terms of 540 rationality. According to such a notion, if a person thinks that she has a normative 541 reason to /, then she is motivated to / if she is fully rational.43 My account is thus 542 not committed to this notion, even if it is compatible with it. 543 As the first purpose corresponds to the conventional meaning of moral sentences 544 according to cognitivism, it should be uncontroversial to assume that moral 39FL01 39 For considerations in relation to GCI that are relevant for the pragmatic account I propose, see Bach 39FL02 and Harnish (1998, pp. 682–711); Bach (1998, pp. 712–722); Morgan (1998, pp. 639–657); and Recanati 39FL03 (2003, pp. 299–332). 40FL01 40 Grice (1989a, p. 26). 41FL01 41 Cf. Brink (1992, pp. 1, 8–9); Smith (1994, pp. 95–96); and Shafer-Landau (2003, p. 166). It might be 41FL02 argued that there is a difference between ''right'' and ''ought'' as regards their relation to moral reasons. 41FL03 On this view, a sentence to the effect that it is morally right that a person /s entails that she has a moral 41FL04 reason to / (in that situation), whereas a sentence to the effect that a person morally ought to / entails 41FL05 that /ing is what she has the strongest moral reason to do (in that situation). However, whether or not this 41FL06 is correct does not affect my arguments. 42FL01 42 See, e.g., Scanlon (1998, p. 17). 43FL01 43 See, e.g., Smith (1994, esp. Chap. 5); and Shafer-Landau (2003, Chap. 8). C. Strandberg 123 Journal : Small-ext 10892 Dispatch : 27-4-2011 Pages : 29 Article No. : 9106 * LE * TYPESET MS Code : R CP R DISK R E V IS E D P R O O F 545 conversations generally have that purpose on this view. In contrast, the second 546 purpose is not in this way connected to what constitutes the conventional meaning 547 of moral sentences on cognitivism. It is clear from Grice's discussion, however, that 548 what purposes conversations have need not be directly connected to the meaning of 549 the sentences uttered in them. 550 (2) The second general purpose of moral conversations is to influence action and, 551 in particular, to make people perform, or avoid to perform, certain actions.44 This 552 exemplifies the purpose Grice describes as ''influencing or directing the actions of 553 others.''45 554 It is widely agreed in metaethics that moral language is essentially practical. 555 Generally, if a person employs a sentence to the effect that /ing has a certain moral 556 characteristic, then we presume that she has a certain action-guiding attitude 557 towards /ing. Indeed, our responses to the cases we considered above confirm this 558 view. A natural explanation of why moral language is practical in this way is, briefly 559 put, that moral language thereby fulfills an important function: it makes it possible 560 for us to regulate one another's behaviour in directions that we find desirable. For 561 instance, assume that, generally, if a person utters a sentence to the effect that /ing 562 ought to be performed, then we presume that she wants that /ing is performed. It is 563 plausible to suppose that this, all things equal, will make us more inclined to / than 564 if she had not made the utterance. Similarly, it is likely to make us more inclined to 565 assist other people in /ing. Further, assume that, generally, if a person's utters a 566 sentence to the effect that she ought to /, then we presume that she is motivated to 567 /. This is also, all things equal, likely to make us more inclined to / than if she had 568 not made the utterance, since it indicates that she wants that /ing is carried out. 569 Likewise, it is likely to make us more inclined to assist her and others in /ing. The 570 explanation of this feature of moral language is presumably very fundamental: in 571 order to live together in a way which promotes our own welfare and the welfare of 572 our family and mates, we need to avoid conflicts and to cooperate with one another. 573 As a result, what actions we carry out will depend on what attitudes we think people 574 have towards them. 575 Granted the assumption that moral language generally functions so as to regulate 576 behaviour, it is plausible to assume that moral conversations generally have as a 577 purpose to influence action. If the purpose of moral conversations to influence 578 action is successfully achieved, this will have as an overall result that we regulate 579 one another's behaviour by means of moral language, and, hence, that moral 580 language fulfills this function. As it is plausible to think that moral language has this 581 function, it is plausible to think that our moral conversations generally have the 582 purpose to influence action. On the other hand, if it were not a general purpose of 583 moral conversations to influence action, it is difficult to see how moral language 584 would be able to fulfill this function, since moral language in that case would need 585 to work in a way that does not match the purpose we have in employing it. It is also 586 important to observe that, in Grice's view, we do not need to be consciously aware 587 what the purposes are of the conversations we are engaged in. Grice's contention is 44FL01 44 Cf. Copp (2001, p. 32). 45FL01 45 Grice (1989a, p. 28). The Pragmatics of Moral Motivation 123 Journal : Small-ext 10892 Dispatch : 27-4-2011 Pages : 29 Article No. : 9106 * LE * TYPESET MS Code : R CP R DISK R E V IS E D P R O O F 588 particularly plausible on the view that the purpose to influence action is a general 589 purpose of moral conversations, since this view helps to explain that the purpose has 590 become habitual and, hence, stays in the background of our moral considerations. 591 We should rather think of it as a tacit assumption that guides our understanding of 592 moral utterances without us necessarily being consciously aware of it. 593 Metaethicists who reject cognitivism and accept expressivism should agree that 594 moral conversations have the general purpose of influencing action. To see this, 595 suppose that it were not a purpose of moral conversations to influence action. In that 596 case, a person's utterance of a sentence to the effect that /ing ought to be performed 597 would not be able to influence action, even if the sentence expresses a certain desire598 like state. This is so since we would not identify the utterance as saying anything 599 that is relevant in the conversation in question. Accordingly, expressivists 600 repeatedly stress that the purpose of moral language is to influence action.46 601 5 The Dual Aspect Account 602 In what follows, I will argue that advocates of MJE should adopt the Dual Aspect 603 Account (DAA) as regards moral motivation. This account states that a person's 604 utterance of a sentence to the effect that she ought to / conveys two things, 605 corresponding to the two purposes of moral discourse identified above. First, such a 606 sentence expresses, in virtue of its conventional meaning, the belief that the person 607 in question ought to /. Second, an utterance of this type of sentence carries a GCI, 608 a standardized conversational implicature, to the effect that she is motivated to /. 609 As the first aspect merely is a statement of cognitivism, I will focus on the second 610 aspect. 611 Let us start with considering an utterance of a sentence to the effect that a certain 612 person ought to /, but where the person in question need not be the speaker herself. 613 We observed in particular three things above. First, a sentence to the effect that a 614 person ought to / entails that she has a moral reason to /, which in turn entails that 615 /ing has some feature which, from the point of view of morality, counts in favour of 616 her /ing. Second, given the objectives of the present paper, it is reasonable to 617 assume that moral conversations have two general purposes: to communicate beliefs 618 about moral issues and to influence action. It was also observed that we need not be 619 consciously aware of the purposes of the conversations we are engaged in. Third, a 620 very basic way to influence other people's actions is to inform them about our 621 attitudes. We observed in particular that if our moral utterances convey that we want 622 that certain actions are performed, or that we are motivated to perform certain 623 actions, this will have the function to influence other people's actions in ways that 624 we find desirable. 625 Now, in view of these considerations, it is reasonable to understand someone who 626 utters a sentence to the effect that a person ought to / as wanting that the person in 627 question /s. That is, if someone utters a sentence which entails that, from the point 628 of view of morality, there is a reason for a person to /, and moral conversations 46FL01 46 See, e.g., Blackburn (1998, pp. 1–4). C. Strandberg 123 Journal : Small-ext 10892 Dispatch : 27-4-2011 Pages : 29 Article No. : 9106 * LE * TYPESET MS Code : R CP R DISK R E V IS E D P R O O F 629 have as a general purpose to influence action, and a basic way of doing so is to 630 inform one another about our attitudes towards these actions, we understand the 631 speaker as wanting that the person in question /s. The reason is that, in 632 consideration of the purpose of moral conversations to influence action, her 633 utterance would lack in relevance unless she wants that the person /s. Put 634 differently, it is difficult to see what the point would be for someone to utter a 635 sentence which entails that there is a moral reason for a person to /, in a 636 conversation that has as a purpose to influence action, unless she wants that the 637 person in question /s. 638 Let us next consider a person's utterance of sentence to the effect that she ought 639 to /. We have seen that an utterance of a sentence to the effect that a person ought 640 to / conveys that the speaker wants that the person in question /s. In case a person 641 utters a sentence according to which she ought to /, this means that her utterance 642 conveys that she wants herself to /; in other words, that she is motivated to /. 643 This can be accounted for in terms of Grice's notion of the maxim of relation, 644 which declares ''Be relevant.''47 In Grice's view, we are justified to assume that a 645 person who is engaged in a conversation contributes to it in the ways that are 646 required to fulfill its mutually accepted purposes. An essential means of doing so is 647 to follow the maxim of relation and, hence, only make utterances that are relevant in 648 view of the purposes of the conversation in question. As we have seen, in order to 649 explain that a person who utters a sentence to the effect that she ought to / 650 contributes to a moral conversation in a way which is relevant given the purpose of 651 such conversations to regulate behaviour, we should understand her to be motivated 652 to /. Consequently, the person's utterance conversationally implicates that she is 653 motivated to /.48,49 654 Moreover, this is a GCI rather than PCI. We noted above that, in order to regulate 655 people's behaviour, moral conversations generally have as a purpose to influence 656 action. This means that moral conversations have this purpose throughout the 657 various contexts in which people are involved in such conversations. In turn, this 658 means that a person's utterance to the effect that she ought to / conversationally 659 implicates that she is motivated to / throughout such contexts. In other words, such 660 an utterance standardly carries this implicature. In particular, given that moral 661 conversations generally have the purpose to influence action, they have this purpose 47FL01 47 Grice (1989a, p. 26). 48FL01 48 This holds only on the condition that the person does not make an additional utterance, or the context 48FL02 contains information, that cancels the implicature. It seems reasonable to think that a person's utterance to 48FL03 the effect that she ought to / usually conveys that she is motivated to / to a significant extent, since it is 48FL04 difficult to see how such utterances could influence action in any substantial manner if this were not 48FL05 assumed to be the case. However, the fact that the person is motivated to / is compatible with her being 48FL06 motivated not to / and that she has stronger motivation to do something else. Additional utterances or 48FL07 contextual information can make clear that she is less motivated to / than what normally is presumed to 48FL08 be the case. Thus, a person's moral utterance can conversationally implicate different strengths of 48FL09 motivation depending on additional utterances or contextual information, and our responses to her moral 48FL10 utterance might vary accordingly. I am grateful to an anonymous referee for The Journal of Ethics for 48FL11 raising this point. 49FL01 49 In Strandberg (forthcoming a), I discuss how the kind of GCI considered in this section can be 49FL02 calculated and cancelled. The Pragmatics of Moral Motivation 123 Journal : Small-ext 10892 Dispatch : 27-4-2011 Pages : 29 Article No. : 9106 * LE * TYPESET MS Code : R CP R DISK R E V IS E D P R O O F 662 also in the absence of specific contextual features. That is, they have this purpose 663 even if the context lacks any special features indicating that this is the purpose of the 664 conversation in question. This purpose thus works as a kind of tacit assumption that 665 governs our understanding of moral utterances. As a result, a person's utterance to 666 the effect that she ought to / conversationally implicates that she is motivated to / 667 even if the context in which it is uttered lacks special features of the mentioned sort; 668 such an utterance carries the implicature unless there are any special circumstances 669 that defeat it. 670 It might be objected that there are cases in which moral conversations do not 671 have the purpose to influence action but a person's utterance to the effect that she 672 ought to / nevertheless conveys that she is motivated to /. This might be the case 673 when the subject matter of the conversation is not practically significant; for 674 example, when it concerns matters people cannot influence or when it concerns 675 abstract moral issues. 676 To respond to this objection, let us start by observing that there are various 677 commonly accepted views that constitute a set of background presumptions about 678 moral utterances and beliefs. For instance, it is generally the case that someone who 679 utters a sentence to the effect that she ought to / is motivated to /. It is not difficult 680 to explain this presumption on the view defended above, as it maintains that such 681 utterances carry a GCI to the mentioned effect. According to another background 682 presumption, it is generally the case that a person who thinks that she ought to / is 683 motivated to /. There are presumably a number of psychological and social 684 explanations of this assumption, such as moral upbringing, socialization, and certain 685 fundamental human features and conditions.50 Another explanation concerns 686 normative reasons. As observed above, the view defended in this paper is not 687 committed to the claim that a sentence according to which a person ought to / 688 entails that she has a normative reason to /, where normative reasons are 689 understood in terms of rationality. However, it is not farfetched to assume that we 690 regularly believe that we have strong normative reasons to do what we morally 691 ought to do. Moreover, it is plausible to assume that we are motivated to do what 692 we think we have strong normative reasons to do in so far as we are rational. On the 693 assumption that we generally are rational, it can consequently be expected that we 694 regularly are motivated to do what we think we morally ought to do. 695 Return now to a person who utters a sentence to the effect that she ought to / in a 696 conversation which does not have as a purpose to influence action. In consideration 697 of the kind of background assumptions I just mentioned, it is nevertheless plausible 698 to assume that we understand the person's utterance as conveying that she is 699 motivated to /. 700 This can be accounted for in terms of Grice's second maxim of quantity, which 701 declares ''Do not make your contribution more informative than is required.''51 702 In order to understand the person above as complying with this maxim and, hence, 50FL01 50 See, e.g., Boyd (1988, pp. 215–216); Brink (1989, p. 49); Svavarsdóttir (1999, pp. 183–187); and 50FL02 Shafer-Landau (2003, pp. 159–160). 51FL01 51 Grice (1989a, p. 26). Cf. Harnish (1998, p. 267); Levinson (2000, pp. 37–38, 112–134); Horn (2004, 51FL02 pp. 12–17); and Jaszczolt (2005, pp. 55–58). Cf. Searle (1969, pp. 141–146). C. Strandberg 123 Journal : Small-ext 10892 Dispatch : 27-4-2011 Pages : 29 Article No. : 9106 * LE * TYPESET MS Code : R CP R DISK R E V IS E D P R O O F 703 as not providing more information than is called for, we need to understand her 704 utterance in such a way that she has no reason to submit any information that 705 modifies it. In particular, we need to assume that she has no reason to inform us that 706 what ordinarily is taken for granted to be the case as a matter of fact is not the case 707 in the particular situation at hand. As a result, it seems that the best explanation 708 of her utterance is that there is no exception to the background presumptions 709 I mentioned above. Consequently, the person's utterance conversationally impli710 cates that she is motivated to /.52 711 Once again it is a matter of a GCI rather than a PCI. As I suggested above, it 712 plausible to think that these background presumptions are quite commonly taken for 713 granted in the various contexts in which people are engaged in moral conversations. 714 This means that a person's utterance to the effect that she ought to / 715 conversationally implicates that she is motivated to / throughout such contexts. 716 The fact that people who are engaged in a moral conversation share certain 717 background presumptions about moral utterances and beliefs is part of its context, 718 but since these presumptions standardly are taken for granted, they are not special 719 contextual features. They are, in other words, not features that merely belong to 720 individual contexts, but rather standing contextual features of moral conversations. 721 As a result, a person's utterance to the effect that she ought to / conversationally 722 implicates that she is motivated to / even in the absence of special contextual 723 features; such an utterance carries the implicature granted that there are no special 724 circumstances that defeat it. 725 We have seen that even if we assume that a moral conversation lacks the second 726 purpose, a person's utterance according to which she ought to / might carry a GCI 727 to the effect that she is motivated to /. Hence, an utterance of this type might carry 728 such a GCI even if the purpose of that particular conversation is not to influence 729 action. The reason is, as we have seen, that there are certain commonly shared 730 background presumptions that generally are present in moral conversations. 731 6 Explaining our Conception of Moral Language and Motivation 732 We are now in the position to see that DAA can explain our conception of the 733 connection between moral language and motivation as it manifests itself in our 734 responses to the various types of thought experiments we considered in Sect. 4. 735 (i) As far as DAA is concerned, there is no conceptually necessary connection 736 between moral judgments and motivation, contrary to what a conceptual version of 737 MJI maintains. That is, DAA does not state that a sentence of the type ''I ought to 738 /,'' merely in virtue of its conventional meaning, expresses a judgment such that if 739 a person holds it, she is motivated to /. In spite of this, DAA can explain our 740 response to individual cases such as C1. The reason is that it states that a person's 741 utterance of a sentence according to which she ought to / carries a GCI to the effect 742 that she is motivated to /, which means that utterances of such a sentence 743 standardly convey this piece of information. As there is such a standardized 52FL01 52 Again, this only holds on the condition that the implicature in question is not cancelled. The Pragmatics of Moral Motivation 123 Journal : Small-ext 10892 Dispatch : 27-4-2011 Pages : 29 Article No. : 9106 * LE * TYPESET MS Code : R CP R DISK R E V IS E D P R O O F 744 connection between utterances of this type of sentence and motivation, we are 745 puzzled if a person makes such an utterance without being motivated to /. 746 What are we to say about someone who makes such an utterance without being 747 accordingly motivated? Given that a sentence of the type ''I ought to /'' does not 748 convey motivation to / merely by means of its conventional meaning, it is not 749 strictly accurate to claim that her use of the sentence is semantically incorrect. But 750 we are surely justified to object that her use of the sentence is extremely misleading 751 in view of the fact that an utterance of such a sentence carries the mentioned GCI.53 752 It is also understandable if we experience her use of it as plainly incorrect. As there 753 is a standardized correlation between uses of this type of sentence and motivation, it 754 is easy to get the impression that moral motivation is a matter of the meaning of the 755 sentence, as a conceptual version of MJI maintains.54 756 Assume that the person's utterance is made in a moral conversation that has both 757 the purposes we identified earlier. In that case her utterance violates the maxim of 758 relation, since it is not relevant in view of the purpose of influencing action. 759 Furthermore, her utterance violates the second maxim of quantity, since it conveys 760 information that is uncalled for: the utterance conversationally implicates that she is 761 motivated to / although she is not. If the moral conversation she is involved in does 762 not have the second purpose, her utterance only violates the latter maxim, but we 763 will still find it puzzling. 764 Moreover, DAA can explain why we might come to doubt that a person who 765 utters that she ought to /, without being motivated to /, even thinks (i.e., judges) 766 that she ought to /. First, a person's utterance of a truth-evaluable sentence 767 standardly conveys that she asserts it and, hence, that she entertains the belief 768 expressed by the sentence.55 Second, according to DAA, a person's utterance of a 769 sentence according to which she ought to / carries a GCI to the effect that she is 770 motivated to /, which means that such an utterance standardly conveys this 771 information. As a consequence, it is plausible to suggest that, if a person utters a 772 sentence of this type without being motivated to /, we might come to doubt that she 773 asserts it and, hence, that she believes that she ought to /. Compare: According to 774 an influential view, a person's utterance of a sentence of the type ''X or Y'' 775 standardly conveys that not both X and Y are the case, and this can be accounted for 776 in terms of a certain GCI. If a person utters ''David or Saul will be admitted to the 777 master programme'' at the same time as we are told that she believes that David and 778 Saul will be admitted, we might come to doubt that she asserts the sentence and, 779 hence, that she believes that David or Saul will be admitted to the programme. 780 It can further be argued that DAA is able to explain why we find cases such as C3 781 puzzling in which a person is reported to think (i.e., judge) that she ought to / at the 782 same time as she lacks motivation to /. Let us first observe that given the 783 background assumptions considered in the last section, we presume that a person 53FL01 53 Cf. Copp (2001, p. 32). 54FL01 54 I provide a fuller explanation in Strandberg (forthcoming a). Cf. Grice (1989a, pp. 37–38). 55FL01 55 According to one view, a person's utterance of a truth-evaluable sentence carries a GCI to the effect 55FL02 that she asserts the sentence and, hence, entertains the corresponding belief. This is in turn explained in 55FL03 terms of the maxim of quality, which says ''try to make your contribution one that is true'' (Grice (1989a, 55FL04 pp. 26). C. Strandberg 123 Journal : Small-ext 10892 Dispatch : 27-4-2011 Pages : 29 Article No. : 9106 * LE * TYPESET MS Code : R CP R DISK R E V IS E D P R O O F 784 who thinks that she ought to / is motivated to / because of factors such as 785 upbringing, socialization, and the connection between morality and normative 786 reasons. This means that DAA already accommodates the notion that there is a close 787 connection between moral thought and motivation. 788 As I have already indicated, DAA is able to provide a further explanation of our 789 response to cases such as C3. To see this, let us start by considering our response to 790 the corresponding non-moral case in the form of C4. We saw that our response to 791 C4 should not be explained by the conventional meaning of a sentence of the type 792 ''X or Y,'' but that it has to be explained pragmatically. It is widely assumed that an 793 utterance of a sentence of the type ''X or Y'' standardly conveys that not both X and 794 Y are the case, and that this can be accounted for in terms of a certain GCI. Our 795 response to C4 thus makes it reasonable to assume that this has formed our 796 conception of the relation between ''X or Y'' and ''not X and Y.'' As a consequence 797 of this fact, we find it misleading to describe a person as thinking that David or Saul 798 will be admitted to the master programme at the same time as she is described as 799 thinking that both of them will. For the same reason, the very thought of a person 800 who combines these beliefs might seem paradoxical. Now, DAA provides an 801 analogous explanation of our response to cases such as C3. That is, it might be 802 suggested that the standardized pragmatic connection between moral utterances and 803 motivation is so strong that it has come to affect our conception of the connection 804 between moral beliefs and motivation. As a consequence, we find it misleading to 805 describe a person as thinking that she ought to / at the same time as she is described 806 as not being motivated to /. Moreover, we might find the very thought of such a 807 person paradoxical. 808 It is further worth observing that on the standard amoralist objection against MJI, 809 we find it possible to conceive of a person who thinks that she ought to / without 810 being motivated to /, even if we may find such a person peculiar. This impression is 811 not difficult to explain on DAA. An amoralist is conceivable on this view because 812 there is no conceptually necessary connection between moral judgments and 813 motivation. Yet, we find her utterly peculiar since our conception of the connection 814 between moral beliefs and motivation is influenced by the fact that there is a 815 standardized connection between certain uses of moral language and motivation. 816 (ii) As far as DAA is concerned, there is no necessary connection between moral 817 judgments and motivation. That is, there is no necessary connection of this kind that 818 needs to apply to other moral judgments in the manner a generalizable version of 819 MJI maintains. As a result, DAA can account for the fact that our responses to cases 820 such as C1 and C3 do not provide any evidence that MJI is generalizable. 821 It is also important to observe that, according to DAA, the standardized 822 pragmatic connection that holds between utterances of a certain type of moral 823 sentence and motivation need not be generalizable to utterances of other types of 824 moral sentences. More precisely, it is only a person's utterance of a particular 825 type of sentence that needs to carry a GCI to the effect that she is motivated to /: 826 a type of sentence which entails that she has a moral reason to /. An essential part 827 of the explanation as to why a person's utterance of a sentence according to which 828 she ought to / carries a GCI to the effect that she is motivated to / consists in the 829 fact that such a sentence entails that she has a moral reason to /. It is particularly The Pragmatics of Moral Motivation 123 Journal : Small-ext 10892 Dispatch : 27-4-2011 Pages : 29 Article No. : 9106 * LE * TYPESET MS Code : R CP R DISK R E V IS E D P R O O F 830 this fact which explains why it is inconsistent with the maxim of relation to make 831 such an utterance without being motivated to / in a moral conversation which has 832 as a purpose to influence action.56 This means that utterances of moral sentences 833 which do not entail the existence of moral reasons of this kind need not convey that 834 the person in question is accordingly motivated.57 It should be stressed, though, that 835 DAA is compatible with the view that utterances of other types of moral sentences 836 convey other kinds of action-guiding states by pragmatic means. 837 (iii) As far as DAA is concerned, motivation is not constitutive of moral 838 judgments, contrary to what an intrinsic version of MJI maintains. That is, DAA 839 does not state that a person's judgment that she ought to / is by itself sufficient for 840 her to be motivated to /. This view is consequently able to explain why our 841 responses to cases such as C1 and C3 do not provide support to the view that there is 842 something in the nature of the moral judgment that explains her motivation to /. 843 As already stressed, I suggest that DAA should be combined with MJE. This means 844 that in order for a person to be motivated to /, she needs to be in a motivational 845 state that is entirely distinct from her moral judgment.58 846 From the perspective of DAA, the underlying reason as to why a person's 847 utterance according to which she ought to / carries a GCI to the effect that she is 848 motivated to / is that it thereby fulfills the purpose of moral conversations to 849 influence action. What is most important from this perspective is consequently that 850 a person who makes such a utterance is motivated to /, not what motivates her to /. 851 At the same time it should be recalled that she utters a sentence which entails that 852 she has a moral reason to /. This means that when a person's moral utterance 853 carries a GCI to the effect that she is motivated to /, her motivation to / typically 854 can be explained by her considerations regarding her moral reason to /.59 As a 855 consequence, DAA can explain why we might be puzzled if a person who makes 856 such an utterance is motivated to / but is not motivated by any moral considerations 857 in relation to /ing. 858 (iv) It should next be noticed that DAA is able to explain why we are more 859 puzzled by cases (such as C6) in which a person utters that she ought to /, is not 56FL01 56 According to the explanation above which refers to various background presumptions about moral 56FL02 utterances, it is only utterances of a moral sentence that entails moral reasons that have the relevant 56FL03 connection to motivation. A similar claim holds for our presumptions about moral judgments. 57FL01 57 Thus, on DAA there are no grounds to think that the following types of utterances need to convey that 57FL02 the person in question is motivated to /. First, utterances of sentences that do not entail that there is a 57FL03 moral reason to / (such as conditionals and disjunctions). Second, utterances of sentences that do not 57FL04 entail, or indicate, that the person herself has a moral reason to /. Third, utterances of sentences that do 57FL05 not entail that the person in question has a moral reason to / now or in the future, e.g., utterances 57FL06 concerning her past behaviour. However, in the two latter cases, moral utterances might pragmatically 57FL07 convey other kinds of action-guiding states; see Strandberg (forthcoming a). 58FL01 58 In Strandberg (2007, pp. 249–260), I propose the following externalist explanation of why a person 58FL02 who believes she ought to / is motivated to /. First, she believes that there are certain non-moral 58FL03 properties that make actions such that they ought to be performed. For example, she might think that 58FL04 helping people in need are among the properties that have this function. Second, she thinks that /ing has 58FL05 (some of) these properties. Likewise, (some of) these properties presumably constitute what she takes to 58FL06 be her reason to /. Third, she has a desire to perform actions that have these non-moral properties. As a 58FL07 consequence, she is motivated by a desire de re, not a desire de dicto, to /. 59FL01 59 See above for this kind of explanation. C. Strandberg 123 Journal : Small-ext 10892 Dispatch : 27-4-2011 Pages : 29 Article No. : 9106 * LE * TYPESET MS Code : R CP R DISK R E V IS E D P R O O F 860 motivated to /, and is reported not to suffer from any mental condition like 861 depression or apathy, than by cases (such as C5) in which she is reported to suffer 862 from such a deficiency. This also means that DAA can explain why a conditional 863 version of MJI might seem more plausible than an unconditional variant of this 864 view. 865 First, it should be observed that even if, as externalists maintain, a person's 866 judgment that she ought to / and her motivation to / are entirely distinct mental 867 states, her mental condition can influence to what extent she is motivated in 868 accordance with her moral judgment.60 Second, it is plausible to assume that it is 869 part of folk psychology that a person's motivation to do what she thinks she ought to 870 do might be negatively influenced by her mental condition. It is therefore plausible 871 to suppose that this aspect of folk psychology is part of the kind of background 872 presumptions regarding the connection between moral judgments and motivation 873 I mentioned in the last section. 874 Assume that a person utters that she ought to /, but that she is not motivated to /. 875 Moreover, assume that her utterance is made in a context in which there are no 876 indications that she suffers from a mental condition such as depression, apathy or 877 emotional disturbances. In consideration of the mentioned background presumption 878 regarding the connection between moral judgments and motivation, it is very likely 879 that they find such a case more puzzling than a case in which a person makes such 880 an utterance without being motivated to /, but where there are indications that she 881 suffers from such a mental condition. In the second case, there is a plausible 882 explanation, in the form of her mental condition, as to why a person says that she 883 ought to /, and thinks this to be the case, at the same time as she fails to be 884 motivated to /. Importantly, in such a case the person's utterance need not carry a 885 GCI to the effect that she is motivated to /, as a result of the contextual evidence 886 regarding her mental condition.61 Thus, it is plausible to understand DAA as saying 887 that a person's utterance according to which she ought to / carries a GCI to the 888 effect that she is motivated to /, provided that she is not understood to suffer from a 889 mental condition such that it can influence her motivation to / negatively. 890 (v) Let us finally observe that DAA can explain why we find communal cases, 891 such as C7, puzzling. We have seen that, on this view, the fact that a person's 892 utterance according to which she ought to / carries a GCI to the effect that she is 893 motivated to / is a matter of the function of moral language. This view assigns two 894 major functions to moral language: first, to inform one another about our beliefs 895 about moral matters and, second, to influence one another's actions. The latter 896 means that moral language is regarded as an essentially social phenomenon since it 897 has as a function to regulate the behaviour of people who live together in a 898 community in such a way that their actions are adjusted to one other. Now, in cases 899 such as C7 the moral language in an entire community seem to lack the second 900 function in view of the fact that no one is motivated in accordance with his or her 60FL01 60 Return to the externalist explanation of moral motivation above. A person's mental condition might 60FL02 weaken, or even eliminate, her desire to perform actions that have the non-moral properties that, in her 60FL03 view, make actions such that they ought to be performed. For example, her mental condition might 60FL04 negatively influence her desire to help people in need. 61FL01 61 Thus, the GCI in question can be cancelled if the context in question involves this information. The Pragmatics of Moral Motivation 123 Journal : Small-ext 10892 Dispatch : 27-4-2011 Pages : 29 Article No. : 9106 * LE * TYPESET MS Code : R CP R DISK R E V IS E D P R O O F 901 moral utterances. As a result, we find such cases quite bewildering. Indeed, on DAA 902 it might even be claimed that people in this community do not have a moral 903 language on the ground that their manner of interacting with one another lacks a 904 function which constitutes a moral discourse.62 905 We saw earlier that considerations of communal cases have made some 906 internalists adopt a communal version of MJI. It is worth observing that DAA can be 907 combined with a picture of moral language which is quite similar to this view. A 908 communal version of MJI allows that a person might hold a moral judgment without 909 being accordingly motivated, granted that she is part of a community in which a 910 significant number of people are motivated in accordance with their moral 911 judgments. As for DAA, it is possible to maintain that a person might make a moral 912 utterance without being accordingly motivated, granted that her utterance is made in 913 a community where moral language has as a function to influence action. That is, 914 unless the utterance is made in a community where moral language has this 915 function, it cannot influence action in which case it is doubtful whether it can be 916 regarded as a genuine moral utterance. 917 7 Conclusion 918 It is frequently claimed in metaethics that we have ''internalist intuitions.'' In this 919 paper, I have in effect argued that this manner of speaking is misleading. We do not 920 have internalist intuitions in the sense of having intuitions that support internalism. 921 What we do have are intuitions that indicate that there is a very close connection 922 between moral language and motivation, but these intuitions can be as readily 923 explained by externalism. Moreover, I have suggested that externalists should 924 explain our conception of moral language and motivation by adopting the Dual 925 Aspect Account: A person's utterance of a sentence according to which she ought to 926 / conveys two things: the sentence expresses, in virtue of its conventional meaning, 927 the belief that she ought to /, and her utterance of the sentence carries a generalized 928 conversational implicature to the effect that she is motivated to /. This view, 929 I argued, is available to any cognitivist who embraces externalism since it does not 930 rest on any particular version of cognitivism. Moreover, it enables cognitivists to 931 defend their view against the internalist argument, since it makes it possible for 932 them to embrace externalism at the same as they supply an account of our 933 conception of the connection between moral language and motivation. 934 Acknowledgments I would like to thank Gustaf Arrhenius, Gunnar Björnsson, John Eriksson, Sofia 935 Jeppsson, Jens Johansson, Victor Moberger, Sven Nyholm, Ragnar Francén Olinder, Jonas Olson, Ingmar 936 Persson, Karl Persson, Jussi Suikkanen and an anonymous referee for The Journal of Ethics for valuable 937 comments on earlier versions of this paper. 62FL01 62 It is quite natural that we find a communal case, such as C7, more puzzling than an individual case, 62FL02 such as C1. In C1 it is only one single utterance that does not adhere to the second function of moral 62FL03 language, whereas in C7 no utterance adheres to this function. Given that a main function of moral 62FL04 language is to influence action, and this is an essentially social phenomenon, we find C7 more puzzling 62FL05 than C1. C. Strandberg 123 Journal : Small-ext 10892 Dispatch : 27-4-2011 Pages : 29 Article No. : 9106 * LE * TYPESET MS Code : R CP R DISK R E V IS E D P R O O F 938 References 939 Audi, Robert. 1997. Moral judgment and reasons for action. In Ethics and practical reason, ed. Garrett 940 Cullity, and Berys Gaut, 125–160. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 941 Bach, Kent. 1998. Standardization revisited. In Pragmatics, vol. IV, ed. Asa Kasher, 712–722. London: 942 Routledge. 943 Bach, Kent, and Robert Harnish. 1998. Indirect acts and illocutionary standardization. In Pragmatics, 944 ed. I.V. Asa Kasher, 682–711. London: Routledge. 945 Bedke, M.S. 2009. Moral judgments purposivism: saving internalism from amoralism. Philosophical 946 Studies 144: 189–209. 947 Björnsson, Gunnar. 2003. How emotivism survives immoralists, irrationality, and depression. Southern 948 Journal of Philosophy 40: 327–344. 949 Blackburn, Simon. 1995. The Flight to Realism. In Virtues and reasons, ed. Rosalind Husthouse, 950 G. Lawrence, and W. Quinn. Oxford University Press: Oxford. 951 Blackburn, Simon. 1998. Ruling passions. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 952 Boisvert, Daniel. 2008. Expressive-assertivism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89: 169–203. 953 Boyd, Richard. 1988. How to be a moral realist. In Essays on moral realism, ed. Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, 954 181–228. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 955 Brink, David. 1989. Moral realism and the foundations of ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University 956 Press. 957 Brink, David. 1992. A puzzle about the rational authority of morality. Philosophical Perspective 958 6: 1–26. 959 Cholbi, Michael. 2009. Moore's paradox and moral motivation. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 960 12: 495–510. 961 Copp, David. 2001. Realist-expressivism: A neglected option for moral realism. Social Philosophy and 962 Policy 18: 1–43. 963 Copp, David. 2009. Realist-expressivism and conventional implicature. In Oxford studies in metaethics, 964 vol. 4, ed. Russ Shafer-Landau, 167–202. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 965 Cuneo, Terence. 1999. An externalist solution to the ''moral problem''. Philosophy and Phenomeno966 logical Research LIX: 359–380. 967 Dancy, Jonathan. 1993. Moral reasons. Oxford: Blackwell. 968 Dreier, James. 1990. Internalism and speaker relativism. Ethics 101: 6–26. 969 Eriksson, John. 2009. Homage to hare: Ecumenism and the Frege-Geach problem. Ethics 120: 8–35. 970 Finlay, Stephen. 2004. The conversational practicality of value judgment. The Journal of Ethics 971 8: 205–223. 972 Finlay, Stephen. 2005. Value and implicature. Philosophers' Imprint 5: 1–20. 973 Foot, Philippa. 1978. Approval and disapproval. In Virtues and Vices, 189–207. Berkeley: University of 974 California Press. 975 Francén, Ragnar. 2010. Moral motivation pluralism. The Journal of Ethics 14: 117–148. 976 Frankena, William. 1976. Obligation and motivation in recent moral philosophy. In Perspectives on 977 morality. Essays by William K. Frankena, ed. K.E. Goodpaster, 12–23. Notre Dame: University of 978 Notre Dame Press. 979 Gert, Joshua, and Alfred Mele. 2005. Lenman on externalism and amoralism: an interplanetary 980 exploration. Philosophia 32: 275–283. 981 Gibbard, Allan. 2003. Thinking how to live. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 982 Greenberg, Mark. 2009. Moral concepts and motivation. Philosophical Perspectives 23: 137–164. 983 Greenspan, P.S. 1998. Moral responses and moral theory: Socially-based externalist ethics. The Journal 984 of Ethics 2: 103–122. 985 Grice, Paul. 1989a. Logic and conversation. In Studies in the ways of words, 22–40. Cambridge: Harvard 986 University Press. 987 Grice, Paul. 1989b. Further notes on logic and conversation. In Studies in the ways of words, 41–57. 988 Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 989 Hare, R.M. 1952. The language of morals. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 990 Harnish, Robert. 1998. Logical form and implicature. In Pragmatics, ed. I.V. Asa Kasher, 230–314. 991 London: Routledge. 992 Horn, Laurence. 2004. Implicature. In The handbook of pragmatics, ed. Laurence R. Horn, and Gregory 993 Ward, 3–28. Oxford: Blackwell. The Pragmatics of Moral Motivation 123 Journal : Small-ext 10892 Dispatch : 27-4-2011 Pages : 29 Article No. : 9106 * LE * TYPESET MS Code : R CP R DISK R E V IS E D P R O O F 994 Jaszczolt, K.M. 2005. Default semantics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 995 Joyce, Richard. 2001. The myth of morality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 996 Kalderon, Mark Eli. 2005. Moral fictionalism. Oxford: Clarendon. 997 Korsgaard, Christine. 1996. Skepticism about practical reason. In Creating the kingdom of ends, 311–334. 998 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 999 Lenman, James. 1996. Belief, desire and motivation: an essay in quasi-hydraulics. American 1000 Philosophical Quarterly 33: 291–301. 1001 Lenman, James. 1999. The externalist and the amoralist. Philosophia 27: 441–457. 1002 Levinson, Stephen. 2000. Presumptive meanings. Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press. 1003 Lippert-Rasmussen, Kasper. 2002. Must morality motivate? Danish Yearbook of Philosophy 37: 7–36. 1004 Lockie, Robert. 1998. What's Wrong with Moral Internalism. Ratio XI: 14–36. 1005 Mele, Alfred. 1996. Internalist moral cognitivism and listlessness. Ethics 106: 727–753. 1006 Miller, C.B. 2008. Motivational internalism. Philosophical Studies 139: 233–255. 1007 Milo, Ronald. 1981. Moral indifference. The Monist 64: 373–393. 1008 Morgan, J.L. 1998. Two types of convention in indirect speech acts. In Pragmatics, ed. I.V. Asa Kasher, 1009 639–657. London: Routledge. 1010 Neale, Stephen. 1992. Paul grice and the philosophy of language. Linguistics and Philosophy 1011 15: 509–559. 1012 Railton, Peter. 2006. Moral factualism. In Contemporary debates in moral theory, ed. James Dreier, 1013 201–219. Oxford: Blackwell. 1014 Recanati, François. 2003. Embedded Implicatures. Philosophical Perspectives 17: 299–332. 1015 Ridge, Michael. 2003. Non-Cognitivist Pragmatics and Stevenson's ''Do so as well!''. Canadian Journal 1016 of Philosophy 4: 563–574. 1017 Ridge, Michael. 2006a. Ecumenical expressivism: finessing Frege. Ethics 116: 302–336. 1018 Ridge, Michael. 2006b. Sincerity and expressivism. Philosophical Studies 131: 487–510. 1019 Ridge, Michael. 2007. Ecumenical expressivism: the best of both worlds? In Oxford studies in metaethics, 1020 vol. 2, ed. Russ Shafer-Landau, 51–76. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1021 Roskies, Adina. 2003. Are ethical judgments intrinsically motivational? Lessons from ''acquired 1022 sociopathy''. Philosophical Psychology 16: 51–66. 1023 Sayre-McCord, Geoffrey. 1997. The metaethical problem. Ethics 108: 55–83. 1024 Scanlon, T.M. 1998. What we owe to each other. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1025 Schroeder, Mark. 2008. Expression for expressivists. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 1026 LXXVI: 86–116 1027 Schroeter, François. 2005. Normative concepts and motivation. Philosophers' Imprint 5: 1–23. 1028 Searle, John. 1962. Meaning and speech-acts. The Philosophical Review 71: 423–432. 1029 Searle, John. 1969. Speech acts. An essay in the philosophy of language. Cambridge: Cambridge 1030 University Press. 1031 Searle, John. 1979. Indirect speech acts. In Expression and meaning. Studies in the theory of speech acts, 1032 30–57. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1033 Shafer-Landau, Russ. 2003. Moral realism. A defence. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1034 Sinclair, Neil. 2007. Expressivism and the practicality of moral convictions. The Journal of Value Inquiry 1035 41: 201–220. 1036 Smith, Michael. 1994. The moral problem. Oxford: Blackwell. 1037 Sneddon, Andrew. 2009. Alternative motivation: a new challenge to moral judgment internalism. 1038 Philosophical Explanations 12: 41–53. 1039 Soames, Scott. 2003. Philosophical analysis in the twentieth century, vol. 2. Princeton: Princeton 1040 University Press. 1041 Strandberg, Caj. 2007. Externalism and the content of moral motivation. Philosophia 35: 249–260. 1042 Strandberg, Caj. Forthcoming a. A dual aspect account of moral language. Philosophy and 1043 Phenomenological Research. 1044 Strandberg, Caj. Forthcoming b. Expressivism and dispositional desires. American Philosophical 1045 Quarterly. 1046 Strandberg, Caj. Forthcoming c. An internalist dilemma-and an externalist solution. Journal of Moral 1047 Philosophy. 1048 Svavarsdóttir, Sigrún. 1999. Moral cognitivism and motivation. The Philosophical Review 108: 1049 161–219. 1050 Tresan, Jon. 2006. De Dicto internalist cognitivism. Noûs 40: 143–165. C. Strandberg 123 Journal : Small-ext 10892 Dispatch : 27-4-2011 Pages : 29 Article No. : 9106 * LE * TYPESET MS Code : R CP R DISK R E V IS E D P R O O F 1051 Tresan, Jon. 2009a. Metaethical internalism: another neglected distinction. The Journal of Ethics 13: 1052 51–72. 1053 Tresan, Jon. 2009b. The challenge of communal internalism. The Journal of Value Inquiry 43: 179–199. 1054 van Roojen, Mark. 2010. Moral rationalism and rationalist amoralism. Ethics 120: 495–525. 1055 Zangwill, Nick. 2008. The indifference argument. Philosophical Studies 138: 91–124. 1056 The Pragmatics of Moral Motivation 123 Journal : Small-ext 10892 Dispatch : 27-4-2011 Pages : 29 Article No. : 9106 * LE * TYPESET MS Code : R CP R DISK